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Abstract
Although coercion is a key element in the governing strategy of 
the North Korean party-state, the authorities in Pyongyang do 
not hold political power at the barrel of a gun alone. Control and 
manipulation of information are equally important tools. This 
paper uses the case of “re-defector” press conferences convened 
in Pyongyang between 2011 and 2013 to illustrate how the 
party-state employs an active information management strategy 
to buttress its rule. Building upon the contemporary “politics of 
authoritarianism” literature and the concept of governmental-
ity, this paper utilizes Thomas Callaghy’s “domain consensus” as 
a framework to codify the reciprocal communicative process by 
which the party-state interacts with the citizenry. The domain 
consensus framework subdivides authoritarian control into a 
trifurcated framework of ideal types: coercive, utilitarian, and 
normative. This working paper focuses on the third of these 
– the normative. As such, this paper explores the information 
management strategy used to promote a consensus on expecta-
tions of life inside and outside North Korea. Using brand new 
structured interview findings, this paper also provides a bottom-
up perspective that shows how the information propagated by 
the government of Kim Jong-un is manipulated, rejected, or 
reproduced by ordinary people.
Keywords: North Korea, politics of authoritarianism, domain 
consensus, North Korean defectors, information management
Introduction1
Although coercion is a key element in the governing strategy 
of the North Korean party-state, where, as in similar political 
systems, a single party dominates access to political office and 
positions of policy-making, the authorities in Pyongyang do not 
hold political power at the barrel of a gun alone. Control and 
manipulation of information are equally important tools. This 
paper uses the case of “re-defector” press conferences convened 
in Pyongyang between 2011 and 2013 to illustrate how the 
party-state employs an active information management strategy 
to buttress its rule.
Building upon the contemporary “politics of authoritarianism” 
literature and the concept of governmentality, this paper utilizes 
Thomas Callaghy’s “domain consensus” as a framework to codify 
the reciprocal communicative process by which the party-state 
interacts with North Korean citizens. The domain consensus 
framework subdivides authoritarian control into a trifurcated 
framework of ideal types: coercive, utilitarian, and normative. 
This working paper focuses on the third of these – the norma-
tive. It explores the information management strategy used to 
promote a consensus on expectations of life inside and outside 
North Korea. Using brand new structured interview findings, it 
provides a bottom-up perspective that shows how the informa-
tion propagated by the government of Kim Jong-un is manipu-
lated, rejected, or reproduced by ordinary people.
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The Return of History and the Politics  
of Authoritarianism
The events of 1989 seemed to mark “the end of history.” With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and apparent triumph of liberal 
democracy, the “third wave” of democratization was predicted 
to sweep the globe. It was a momentous and paradigmatic 
moment: Russia and other former Soviet republics were imple-
menting economic and political reforms; they were on the road 
to democracy. Soon, so too would everyone else.
But then history returned. Through the 1990s and into the 2000s 
it became clear that authoritarianism was not going away after 
all. Authoritarian regimes2 proved more durable than scholars 
had suspected. In response, the study of non-democratic regimes 
and the “politics of authoritarianism” took a turn towards greater 
depth and sophistication.
Much credit must go to Barbara Geddes, whose work on regime 
transitions is foundational. She successfully disaggregated differ-
ent types of dictatorial regime, thus rescuing “dictatorship” 
from its functionally useless prior definition: “anything that isn’t 
democracy.” Using an innovative categorization of authoritarian 
regime types (personalist; military; and single-party), Geddes 
argued that understanding the differences between different 
types uncovers systematic differences in how—during times of 
economic crisis—such regimes do or do not break down.3
Building upon Geddes’ work, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way 
challenged the “pronounced democratizing bias” of the immedi-
ate post-Cold War period, positing (1) degree of linkage to the 
West and (2) capacity of “state and governing party structures” as 
the structural variables which most accurately determine author-
itarian regime durability. “Where linkage to the West was high, 
competitive authoritarian regimes democratized. Where linkage 
was low, regime outcomes hinged on incumbents’ organizational 
power. Where state and governing party structures were well 
organized and cohesive, regimes remained stable and authori-
tarian; where they were underdeveloped or lacked cohesion, 
regimes were unstable, though they rarely democratized.”4
The same authors’ supplementary insight into the durability of 
single-party states concerned the hypothesis that regimes led 
by “revolutionary” parties exhibit the components of durable 
authoritarian rule more than those without “revolutionary” 
character. They argued, in short, that single-party regimes forged 
of a revolutionary process have more organizational power 
and thus capacity to survive the fluctuating fortunes of state 
construction and management. Although the Soviet Red Army 
put the North Korean variant in place—with Kim Il-sung as its 
leader—this followed an extensive guerrilla campaign centered 
on Jilin Province, part of the modern day People’s Republic of 
China. This forms the historical backdrop to the revolutionary 
pedigree ascribed to the guerrilla force’s institutional successor, 
the Korean Workers’ Party.5
The argument that strong party structures are a key determi-
nant of regime durability was substantiated by Milan Svolik, who 
concluded that authoritarian systems under single-party rule are 
more resilient than other types of system because party organi-
zations are “incentive structures that encourage sunk political 
investments by their members.”6 Put simply, once you are in, 
you are in for the long haul. Furthermore, party organizations 
provide a mechanism for the exercise of political control over 
armed forces—not least by co-opting commanding officers into 
party structures. Rather than seeking to fence in and regulate the 
functional purpose of the military outside the civilian administra-
tive structure, durable party states bring commanding officers 
into the party. The ability of authoritarian parties to essentially 
(re)structure much of society around the goals of the party helps 
explain their durability.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, hereditary succession may also 
contribute positively to high regime durability. This is because 
succession provides the moment of gravest danger for a regime, 
specifically ones that lack effective mechanisms for conflict resolu-
tion and credible commitment. It places embedded networks and 
systems of loyalty under renewed pressure; nobody can be sure 
what the new leader will do, who or what they now answer to, or 
to whom will go the spoils under the new system.
This threat and its potential consequences render acquiescence 
to hereditary rule attractive (in terms of being the least bad 
option) for risk-averse elites. The dangerous process of choosing 
a new leader from within the ruling organization may lead elites 
to “support hereditary succession as a method for preserving 
their influence” and mitigate “the uncertainty that surrounds an 
aging ruler and an impending leadership change,” according to 
Jason Brownlee. Hereditary succession clarifies the succession 
process, reduces the potential for intra-elite conflict, and creates 
a “‘focal point’ for elite consensus.”7
Then, is that all it takes to explain the high level of regime resil-
ience in the North Korean case? Certainly, theoretical insights 
into the durability of party-states and dynastic rule provide 
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pertinent conceptual clarity. North Korea is a state where 
the practical business of rule takes place through the Korean 
Workers’ Party and one that has gone through two rounds of 
hereditary succession.
These insights are critical to our understanding of various types 
of authoritarian rule. However, we do not think they are suffi-
cient. We argue that ending the analysis at this point results in an 
overweening focus on the state, state organizations, and elites. 
It demands that ordinary citizens be conceptualized as passive 
observers of the political process, which they are not. To rectify 
this imbalance, we propose an additional important variable for 
analysis: the mechanism through which state power manifests 
itself in and through society.
The concept of “governmentality” takes us beyond the conven-
tional understanding of power as a simple hierarchy of state 
over citizen. It posits that control is not merely dictated above 
by the state and reproduced from below by the citizenry.8 Power 
is diffuse and interactive. Governmentality encourages holis-
tic analysis of government, or, in the words of Mitchell Dean, 
to “analyse those practices [of government] that try to shape, 
sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspira-
tions, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups.” 
An “analytics of government” is concerned with how thought 
is conceived “within programmes for the direction and reform 
of conduct.”9 In short, it is how governments define the field of 
action in which citizens live, think, and act.
As such, governmentality provides crucial insights into the 
foundations of state legitimacy and authoritarian durability. 
However, herein lingers a problem; governmentality is primarily 
conceptual. It lacks a clear framework for understanding how, 
on the ground, governments such as the party-state of North 
Korea interact with citizens to define what is and is not accept-
able. Fortunately, there is insight in Thomas Callaghy’s “domain 
consensus,” which offers a disaggregation of governmentality 
and results in a usable framework for understanding the consti-
tution of state-society relations.10
Callaghy seeks to explain the mechanisms by which governments 
manufacture consent over what both state and people can or 
cannot, will or will not do. Basing his research on authoritarian-
ism in southern Africa, he posits three ideal types of consensus 
structure—coercive, utilitarian, and normative—arguing that all 
three combine to constitute the specific set of power relations 
that exist between a given state and its citizenry.
Neither the coercive nor utilitarian mechanisms of control and 
consensus formation directly concern us here, but a brief expla-
nation will be instructive. The first mechanism, coercion, is 
axiomatic, incorporating as it does all the physical acts of violence 
and repression—and the resultant fear of those same acts on the 
part of citizens—that operate on a continuous basis to extract 
compliance from citizens either individually or in groups. The 
second, utilitarian mechanism, involves bargaining and negotia-
tion between and among individuals and the state. For instance, 
this can be the bargain between state and citizen regarding the 
availability and type of distributed rations, or a much larger deal 
between the state and individual elite(s) over access to material 
resources, business contracts and the like.
Our point of interest in this paper is the third ideal type: normative. 
Callaghy posits that this type of consensus arises when a majority 
of citizens accept the right of a particular system or ruler to govern, 
and voluntarily—i.e., most would continue to do so in the hypothet-
ical absence of coercion or utilitarian incentives—observe the rules 
and norms of that system of governance as laid down by the ruling 
elite.11 In democratic systems, plebiscites act as a mechanism for 
the creation, at regular intervals, of normative consensus. However, 
this does not imply that authoritarian systems without free and 
fair elections are incapable of arriving at the same outcome. As 
Callaghy notes, a normative domain consensus can also be forged 
through the artful instrumentalization of information.12
This working paper explores precisely this process, specifically 
the North Korean party-state’s use of so-called “re-defector 
press conferences” as a tool to formulate and maintain a norma-
tive consensus with the domestic citizenry. Through a carefully 
constructed information management strategy, the party-state 
harnesses the power of information to define the field of action 
and buttress its governing legitimacy.13
Re-defector Press Conferences:  
Information Management in Action
After Kim Jong-un came to power, the young ruler and his party-
state faced a variety of problems that had the potential to create 
instability and undermine the legitimacy of the new leadership. 
The North Korean economy was suffering from macroeconomic 
instability, inequality, and corruption,14 while insufficient and 
unstable energy supplies plagued even Pyongyang, which was 
dealing with some of the worst electricity shortages it had seen 
in years.15
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As many North Koreans struggled, the persistent diffusion of 
popular South Korean dramas and pop music smuggled into the 
country—often featuring wealthy South Koreans in luxurious 
settings—served as subversive advertisements for a better life 
south of the DMZ. A May 2012 report commissioned by the U.S. 
State Department confirmed what many already knew: due to 
significant shifts in North Korea’s media landscape, the “growing 
access to a range of media and communication technologies is 
undermining the state’s monopoly on what its citizens see, hear, 
know and think.”16 The Kim Jong-un government thus faced the 
task of combating socio-economic difficulties at the same time as 
finding tools by which to prevent, refute, criticize or manipulate 
a burgeoning array of unsanctioned external information and 
other media spreading throughout the North Korean populace, 
which threatened to portend undesired consequences, such as 
defections or potential dissatisfaction with the government.
One of Pyongyang’s pivotal information management strategies 
in this context has been a number of highly publicized “re-defec-
tor” press conferences. These showpiece events feature North 
Koreans who previously defected to South Korea but subsequently 
returned to North Korea.17 The use of press conferences was inher-
ently risky, as the returnees reminded the audience that some 
fellow North Koreans are indeed leaving “the best country in the 
world.” Nevertheless, the propaganda authorities appear to have 
made a calculated risk. Instead of trying to hide the defector issue 
from the public and severely punishing anyone caught attempting 
to defect to the South—as in the past18—the Kim Jong-un govern-
ment began pursuing double defectors, officially welcoming them 
back with open arms and using them to criticize the South and, 
importantly, discourage other would-be refugees from leaving.19 
(See Table 1 in the Appendix for a table of the re-defector press 
conferences covered.)
The first of these re-defector press conferences involved an elderly 
woman called Pak Jong-suk on June 28, 2012.20 This was followed 
by Kim Kwang-hyok and his wife and child on November 8.21 In each 
of the 2012 re-defection press conferences, the returning North 
Koreans conveyed very similar scenarios for their defections to 
the South and their decisions to subsequently return to the North: 
treacherous South Korean intelligence agents lured them to defect 
via subterfuge and manipulation; they endured a miserable life 
within the South’s capitalist system; they longed to return to life in 
the North; and ultimately the Supreme Leader generously welcomed 
them back home despite their betrayal.22 Many of the messages 
and themes conveyed in the press conferences were consistently 
repeated, implying a fixed authorial voice from Pyongyang.
At her press conference, one of Pak Jong-suk’s statements was 
particularly illuminating: “Referring to the living conditions of the 
‘defectors from the north’, she said the jobs they could find at 
best were nothing but waste cleaning, vessel washing and servic-
ing and other most hateful and difficult jobs.”23
This shows that, instead of attempting to negate the quality of 
life depicted in South Korean media, the North’s information 
management strategy is to utilize re-defectors like Pak to accentu-
ate socio-economic divisions between relatively wealthier South 
Koreans and a purported underclass of North Korean defectors.24 
Thus, one of Pak’s key messages is that even though the South 
may be relatively wealthier, the North Koreans living there are 
relatively poorer and more miserable than they were in North 
Korea.25 This is not new, but is a particularly overt manifestation 
of a trend that has been ongoing since the turn of the century.26
In 2013, several press conferences reaffirmed Pyongyang’s 
commitment to this policy line. In late January at the People’s 
Palace, Kim Kwang-ho, Ko Kyung-hee, and other re-defectors 
gave testimonials that reinforced themes highlighted in the 
2012 press conferences. The press conferences further empha-
sized forgiveness, as the defectors were portrayed as victims of 
South Korean deception. Kim Kyong-ok recalled that she was 
taken to South Korea “due to threat and appeasement made 
by Kim Kwang-chol, specialist in buying and tempting people 
wandering about China’s border area, via refugee camps in 
China and Thailand.”27
Additionally, the returning defectors portrayed themselves as 
mere mortals who made mistakes. Just as Pak Jong-suk was 
pursuing an ill-fated and “foolish idea to meet with my father 
in the South and ask him for money,” Kim Kwang-ho and Kim 
Ok-shil had a “stupid” idea about becoming rich in the South,28 
which ended in failure.
The press conferences continued to exploit the guilt and 
emotional hardships that many North Korean refugees experi-
ence as a result of leaving families and hometowns behind. 
Returning defectors lamented how much they missed living in 
North Korea, and how their defections had caused hardships 
for loyal family members who remained in North Korea. Pak 
Jong-suk expressed fears that her defection may have resulted 
in punishment for the rest of her family (as is often the case), 
but, upon returning to North Korea, was permitted to live with 
her son’s family in Pyongyang.29 Kim Kwang-hyok and his wife, 
Ko Jong-nam, were concerned about their son in South Korea, 
since “Children of the ‘defectors from the north’ are […] left out 
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in the cold in the south […] reluctant even to go outside, it being 
a common occurrence that they are beat at schools.”30 Building 
on these sentiments, Kim Kwang-ho and Kim Ok-shil testified 
that concerns about their child’s future motivated their return. 
“In the south,” Kim said, “we could not take responsibility for our 
fate, of course, nor the future of our daughter.”31
According to this interpretation, the North Korean defectors were 
not inherently treacherous, so their lapses in judgment could 
be forgiven thanks to the “generosity” of the Supreme Leader. 
This is also an important development in Pyongyang’s treat-
ment of defectors: they were formerly chastised and threatened 
with severe punishment for defecting, but were subsequently 
welcomed back into Kim Jong-un’s loving arms.32
Beginning with the May 17, 2013 press conference featuring 
Kang Kyong-suk and two other returnees, the setting changed 
to a more comfortable, intimate atmosphere – devoid of glaring 
lights, multiple reporters, cameras, and microphones of the early 
conferences.33 This new atmosphere reinforced the notion that 
the re-defectors were not being punished, but were instead 
victims recounting horrible tales of deception and trafficking by 
deceitful South Koreans, including a Christian pastor.
The same comfortable atmosphere, as well as criticism of South 
Korean “flesh traffickers” (including clergymen), featured promi-
nently in the re-defection interview with nine teenagers and 
young adults who were repatriated to North Korea from Laos 
(the so-called “Laos Nine”).34 In the interview, the U.S. is also 
explicitly linked to the plot to kidnap North Koreans, as an Ameri-
can woman from the “Association for Freedom of North Korea” 
apparently provided funding and worked with a South Korean 
pastor surnamed Jang. This reinforces the message that although 
the Americans and South Koreans feign interest in freedom and 
human rights in North Korea, they are actually kidnapping North 
Koreans and violating their human rights. In her December 2013 
interview, Choe Kye-sun echoes the claim that “flesh traffickers” 
are taking unwitting North Koreans to the South.35
A Kernel of Truth: The View from Below
In order to investigate how North Korean citizens might be 
expected to receive the content of re-defector press conferences, 
structured interviews were conducted with members of the 
defector refugee community in Seoul. The group was constituted 
of ten individuals representing different age cohorts and dates of 
departure from North Korea. Six came from border cities along 
the Tumen River; two from Pyongyang; and two from inland pro-
vincial cities. Three were in their twenties, five in their thirties, 
and two in their fifties. Each respondent is indicated hereafter 
by a combination of a single letter and a number: respondents 
A1-A3 left North Korea between 1998 and 2003, B1-B4 departed 
between 2004 and 2009, and C1-C3 between 2010 and the pres-
ent day. (See Table 2 in the Appendix.)
All of the interviewees were given the same set of questions, 
which asked them to stipulate their socio-economic status 
three years prior to departing North Korea, explain their media 
consumption behavior while in North Korea prior to defection, 
and to consider the affective reception of the press conferences 
by North Koreans in light of their personal experiences.36
Though a small sample of this nature is not statistically signif-
icant—the refugee community in South Korea as a whole 
numbered more than 27,500 by the end of December 201437—
it does provide a nuanced, illuminating view of the way the 
re-defector press conferences are interpreted and their potential 
for affective reception by North Korean citizens.
Responses indicate that the effectiveness of re-defector press 
conferences as a tool of social control is predicated upon a combi-
nation of structural factors (pertaining to the social environment 
in North Korea) and functional ones (related to the press confer-
ence content itself). In the former category are a lack of counter-
vailing information and age group distinctions, as well as limited 
provision of power to residential districts in provincial areas.38 
These are discussed below.
However, the functional component is arguably the crucial one. 
As we will see, the element of truth that underpins the narratives 
conveyed in the re-defector press conferences also contributes 
to their affective impact.
As the respondents note, even though the South Korean govern-
ment has established systems to help arrivals from North Korea 
find employment by offering job training and subsidies to compa-
nies that hire North Koreans, many refugees do not find employ-
ment beyond comparatively low-paying jobs. Similarly, although 
North Korean refugees are eligible for specific scholarships, 
stipends and free university tuition, university dropout rates are 
disproportionately high and students struggle with bullying and 
an education gap with their South Korean peers.
One result of this state of affairs is that the North Korean govern-
ment has a kernel of truth with which to propagate the notion 
that going from North to South Korea is not a good or wise idea 
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for its citizens. The public propagation of the return of individu-
als from South Korea contributes to this process, representing an 
active element of the government’s information management 
strategy. Even in cases where individuals suspect or believe that 
North Korean state media output is partially fabricated, this does 
not neutralize the affective reception of press conference content.
The causal relationship between external media exposure and 
perception of the world beyond North Korea’s borders has already 
been demonstrated. A 2012 Intermedia report established through 
qualitative research that North Koreans with access to external 
media “make natural comparisons between their own lives and 
their perceptions of the outside world, particularly South Korea.”39
Though by definition impossible to test, it is plausible to hypoth-
esize that the opposite must also be true. North Koreans who 
do not have regular access to external media—or to indirect 
experiences of life in South Korea, for instance through family 
or friends—are less likely to have a positive perception of the 
outside world, and less likely to make natural comparisons 
between their own lives and those of others. Faced with little 
other than the North Korean media, they are presumably left 
without the tools to make nuanced comparisons.
Then, given that media penetration is evidently an impor-
tant factor, it is worthwhile to recall that North Korea is not 
East Germany. West German television signals consistently 
penetrated approximately 85 percent of East German territory. 
As early as 1973, East German leader Erich Honeker conceded 
the influence of “Western mass media, especially radio and 
television of the Federal Republic, which here everybody can 
switch on and off as he likes.” It is said that, given the opportunity, 
people would avoid living in “Dresden or the Greifswald area,” 
the only large regions that the West German media could not 
penetrate. Writing shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
Dieter Buhl, a senior editor of Die Zeit in Germany, recalled: “East 
Germans could receive at least half a dozen Western networks. 
Their ratings by far surpassed those of the East German stations, 
especially RIAS […] which enjoyed, by far, more listeners in the 
East than in the West.”40
No such statement is likely to be forthcoming from Kim Jong-un 
or his government. In the North Korean case, the issue of exter-
nal media penetration is quantitatively different. Only five 
percent of respondents in a 2010 survey (sample size: 250) cited 
South Korean television as an important source of information, 
and a mere 13 percent pointed to the Chinese equivalent.41 The 
challenge for citizens is not one of avoiding a few inland valleys 
that cannot receive external media; rather, the trick is to acquire 
real estate in one of the few locations that can.42
Moreover, even such modest statistical findings are guaranteed 
to have been influenced by the geographical distribution of 
people available for surveying. It is common knowledge that the 
overwhelming majority of refugees who leave North Korea are 
from just three of the country’s nine provinces: North Hamgyong, 
South Hamgyong, and Ryanggang, all of which are on or near 
the North Korea-China border, and all of which thus receive—
albeit not in all areas due to the mountainous topography of 
the region—Chinese television signals, not to mention radio and 
smuggled media content on DVDs or flash memory drives. Statis-
tics show that 85.1 percent of all the defectors in South Korea at 
the end of August 2014 were from these three provinces.43
This matters, since the interview respondents repeatedly cited 
the presence or absence of countervailing information, offering 
the ability for an individual to compare, as an important element 
in the effectiveness of re-defector press conferences. “The very 
first time I thought that our North Korean news was a little 
dreary and boring was when I saw Chinese broadcasts,” respon-
dent A1 commented. “As someone who knew nothing about the 
outside world, I had considered the North Korean news style to 
be perfectly normal.” In a similar vein, B1 asserted that “If you 
are someone who does not know the real situation inside South 
Korea” then you will be more heavily influenced by the re-defec-
tor press conferences. The most recent escapee, C3, concluded 
that “people with defectors in their family will not believe it,” 
implying that direct personal knowledge of the circumstances 
that surround defection and re-defection play an important role 
in altering the frame of reception.
“There is no way that North Korean residents who only hear 
about South Korea by word-of-mouth could know that […] it is 
mostly lies,” B2 said. According to B4, the ones who are least 
likely to believe the press conference content are families and 
friends of defectors and senior government officials who “already 
know the state North Korea is in.”
“…the interview respondents repeatedly 
cited the presence or absence of 
countervailing information, offering the 
ability for an individual to compare, as an 




In addition to the presence or absence of alternative source 
of information, an individual’s age and social status emerged 
as interlinked key determinants of his or her receptiveness to 
re-defector press conference content. A number of respondents 
pointed out that while access to external sources of information 
is undoubtedly an important variable, older people and those 
working in specific, highly controlled economic sectors are in 
any case more likely than younger people and, broadly defined, 
‘market participants’ to trust the narratives expounded upon in 
the re-defector press conferences.
A2 said that in his view reception of the press conference message 
“depends on people’s awareness and analytical thinking skills.” 
C1 agreed, before stating that analytical ability is closely linked 
to social position: “There is a high chance that people who do 
nothing but work under harsh regulation, like farmers or soldiers 
working in textile mills, will accept the words of the re-defec-
tors at face value.” C3, for whom reception is at least partially a 
matter of age, said, “Most older people will probably take it at 
face value. The average person will half-believe it.”
Superimposing another layer upon the issue while reflecting 
the inherent but often forgotten diversity of the North Korean 
populace, C2 said, “I want to say that everyone is different. 
People who are disillusioned by the political system and have 
an interest in South Korea will pay scant attention to what 
comes on Korean Central Broadcast. However, people who are 
ignorant under that social system will certainly take that content 
on board.”
As we have seen, reception of the re-defector press conferences 
is influenced by pertinent societal divisions: between citizens 
with access to information provided by non-DPRK actors and 
those without, between older and younger generations, and 
between people working in “harshly regulated” industries and 
others engaged in those—like market activities—where one’s 
own initiative frequently offers a distinct advantage. However, 
these divisions are not the whole story. Finally, the press confer-
ences contain another important element: truth.
If it is to succeed over the long term, any information manage-
ment strategy should contain a kernel of truth – preferably more 
than one. Without the ability to elicit an emotional response 
from recipients, an information management strategy will not 
have affective power. Narratives of re-defection are no excep-
tion. Respondents assert that both the authenticity of the voices 
of the re-defectors in the press conferences and the kernels of 
truth that they convey are key elements in their reception.
A1 asserted that the very fact that the people who appeared in 
the press conferences really had been to South Korea and later 
returned gave their words weight, in spite of the fact that, as 
A3 said, “Defectors all say that [the re-defectors] do [the press 
conferences] under pressure from the North Korean govern-
ment.” This is highly likely to be so, but that does not alter the 
fact that what underpins the press conferences is an uncomfort-
able truth: that the difficulties faced by some—though by no 
means all—defectors in South Korea are very real.
According to C1, “This is a strategy with a decent chance of success. 
It will even garner a sympathetic ear from North Korean residents 
who know about South Korea.” C1 provided a story to illustrate 
why this should be so, saying that it had been his intention to 
defect with another individual from his native city. However, at 
the last minute the second individual refused to depart, telling C1:
“You know how to draw and your computer skills are good, so 
you will be able to live well anywhere. I don’t know how to do 
anything; I’m just old. Even if [I] went to South Korea, yes I would 
probably live better than I do here, but in my heart I would always 
feel bad. I’m sorry, but leave by yourself, and when you succeed 
please go and find my relatives in Japan.”
The response of C1’s acquaintance reveals a high degree of 
knowledge about South Korea, and implies that this degree of 
knowledge actually reduced his or her desire to leave the North, 
arguably the opposite effect to that anticipated. Reiterating the 
point, B2 declared, “Anyone who is not able to access South 
Korean culture or broadcasts will think, ‘Oh, so if I defect I will 
receive that kind of treatment.’”
“There really have been cases,” B2 revealed, “of North Korean 
residents asking their families in the South, ‘Were you hoodwinked 
into going there by the South Koreans?’ and ‘In South Korea, are 
North Koreans really not even treated as people?’”
To C3, this state of affairs made perfect sense. “I, too, could have 
trusted that North Korean propaganda,” she concluded. “Even 
without the government, it is already well known from people 
who have defected that North Korean people are marginalized in 
South Korea and have trouble finding work and making a living. 
People have known that for a while.”44
Conclusion
Re-defector press conferences form part of an information 
management strategy to forge a normative consensus shaping 
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people’s expectations of life at home and abroad. Information 
management of this type is crucial for the North Korean party-
state in an era when its legitimacy is being challenged by the act 
of defection and circulation of foreign media that counters the 
state’s description of North Korea as an advanced, “civilized” 
society. Re-defectors are instrumentalized to convey carefully 
calibrated messages to the domestic audience: to emphasize the 
notion that South Koreans, Americans, and human rights activ-
ists operating in the border region are deceptive, dangerous, and 
exploitative people; to declare that defectors are now welcome 
back in the country and will not be punished as criminals; and to 
highlight the notion that while South Korea is the more affluent 
society on the Korean Peninsula, it is one in which arriving North 
Koreans form part of an underclass, suffering discrimination and 
lower quality of life than their South Korean counterparts.
Further research is needed before it will become possible to 
judge the overall effectiveness of this information management 
strategy. However, structured interviews conducted with ten 
North Korean defectors indicate that it has the potential to bring 
about the intended result. Although some North Korean citizens, 
quite rightly, suspect fabricated content and the coercion of 
participating individuals in the press conferences, the messages 
are nevertheless internalized. In the interior of the country this 
reflects an absence of alternative information sources, while on 
the fringes of the state it serves to buttress pre-existing regimes 
of knowledge concerning the hardships defectors face in South 
Korea. This lends the press conferences a ring of truth, and 
impacts relative expectations of life on either side of the DMZ.
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Appendix 
Table 1. Re-defector Press Conferences in the Kim Jong-un Era
Name(s) Date Type Themes Content














to the benevolent 
motherland
Pak Jong-suk claims she was captured by South Korean intelligence 
agents while crossing the Sino-NK border in an attempt to reunite 
with her father, who defected during the Korean War. She hoped 
to live with her family in South Korea, but found she was distrusted 
and devalued, even by her own family, because she was from the 
North. Pak describes working menial jobs, constant corruption and 
deceit, and said her life in the South was worthless. She expressed 
her love and adoration at her warm welcome from the benevolent 













commitment to the 
benevolent moth-
erland; trickery and 
abduction; immoral 
Southern society
This family says a broker lured them in and "South Korean pup-
pet forces" deceived them into thinking South Korea would be 
a decent place to live. Kim and Ko say they met dehumanization 
and poverty upon arrival. The two claim children of defectors 
are targets of abuse and exclusion and were prompted to return 
after seeing the kindness of Kim Jong-un in a video, which they 
found compared well to the everyday cruelty aimed at defector 
children, a fate that Ko Jong-nam feared her son would face. The 
two praised Kim Jong-un and expressed their desire to contribute 
productively to the DPRK as a reunited family.
Kim Kwang-ho, 









Human rights and hy-
pocrisy; intelligence 
services; abduction 
and trickery; China 
and profit motive; 
imperialism; immoral 
Southern society
Kim Kwang-ho and Kim Ok-sil claim a corrupt priest took them to 
South Korea with ties to the South Korean intelligence service and 
the chairman of an American human rights organization who lied 
to them about the socioeconomic conditions for defectors. The two 
convey dissatisfaction with the character of South Korean society and 
returned to the DPRK after seeing the gracious welcome given to Pak 
Jong-suk. Third returnee Ko Kyung-hui crossed the border to China 
intending to make money, but was tricked by a man who offered to 
take her to Canada only to wind up in South Korea. Ko claims she was 
abused and mistreated by the South Korean authorities, even as they 











ment to the be-
nevolent motherland; 
hypocrisy and human 
rights; immoral 
Southern society
Kang Kyong-suk was taken to South Korea in 2010, Kim Kyong-ok 
in 2011, and Ri Hyok-chul in 2007. Kang claims she was tricked 
and bribed into defecting and then detained and interrogated at 
the "Joint Centre for Interrogation of Defectors from the North," 
an agency that brings in defectors to the South so as to topple the 
DPRK government. She notes that "refugee camps" in Thailand and 
China are preyed upon. Kim claims her captors told her that South 
Korea is not wealthy but is willing to spend money on defaming the 
DPRK. Ri says his brother (another defector) and a South Korean 
pastor deceived and stole from him, though he ultimately blames 
the South Korean National intelligence service for his situation. 
All three re-defectors called the human rights issue a hypocritical 
"smear campaign" against the DPRK.
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
10
The "Laos Nine" 












sy and human rights; 
China and profit 
motive; commitment 
to the benevolent 
motherland
This group of teenagers and young adults lived with a South Korean 
clergyman in China before being taken to South Korea by human 
traffickers. The clergyman kidnapped wanderers in the Chinese 
borderlands and forced them to practice Christianity in the South 
Korean style, as well as punishing all acts of loyalty to the DPRK. The 
teenagers claim they were contacted by a U.S. representative from 
the "Association for Freedom of North Korea" who funded the cap-
tor of the teenagers and had previously sent forced other defectors 
to go to the U.S. They finished by praising the benevolence of the 
DPRK and of Kim Jong-un in protecting their beloved country.
Pak Jin-gun and 
Jang Kwang-chol







and trickery; China 
and profit motive; 
hypocrisy and hu-
man rights; immoral 
Southern society
These two claim "puppet forces" in South Korea used brokers and 
intelligence service agents to trick, bribe, and abduct defectors 
caught in the Chinese borderlands, and that these organiza-
tions are getting bolder. The time they spent in South Korea was 
a nightmare marked by desperation and poverty. They say that 
were aware of smear campaigns run by the South Korean govern-
ment and intelligence service to malign the DPRK for its human 
rights records, intending to capture North Koreans and paint 
them as defectors in an attempt to harm the DPRK's international 
image. They say the returned to the North after seeing a press 
conference by an earlier re-defector and express a desire to work 











and trickery; China 
and profit motive; 
hypocrisy and human 
rights; immoral South 
Korean society
Choe Kye-soon, appearing with Pak Jong-suk, claims she was bribed 
into defecting to the South whilst in China making money. Both Choe 
and Pak emphasize the luring tactics of the South Korean Intelligence 
Service from embassies abroad. Choe underscores the debauchery 
of South Korean society and the class divide between those from 
the North and other (South) Koreans, claiming that everyone there 
lives miserably (especially defectors). Choe and Pak express relief for 
returning to the DPRK and an appreciation for the motherland. Choe 
vows to devote herself to serving the party and country. Pak claims 
to be writing a book about her experiences.
Note: Content taken from KCNA summaries written in English and Korean.  





Home Town, City or Province Age Attitude
A1 1998 Hyesan 33 Truth, Effective
A2 2000 Chongjin 50 Lies, Effective
A3 2002 Pyongyang, Chongjin 27 Lies, Ineffective
B1 2006 Chongjin 38 Lies, Effective
B2 2007 Musan 36 Truth, Effective
B3 2009 Hyesan 55 Lies, Effective
B4 2009 Hyesan 30 Lies, Effective
C1 2010 Pyongyang, Hamgyong Province 30 Lies, Effective
C2 2011 Hyesan 28 Lies, Effective
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